The Independent Oversight of Gossipmongers

The Madison Police Department (MPD) is 170 years old with a budget upwards of $90,000,000. 170 years is ample time to address flaws that result in unnecessary harm, and $90,000,000 annually is more than enough money to fund new and effective ways to significantly reduce deadly biases and mistakes while increasing officer wellness and public safety. The power to require such corrections through policy changes, implementation and enforcement lies with the Madison Common Council (MCC). Whatever the state may be of today’s MPD, the MCC is responsible. It is imperative that the MCC prioritize public safety when it comes to police interactions with the public, which now includes protecting independent, community police oversight. We have seen what happens when MCC members don’t do this and instead succumb to political ambitions. People die.

For several months now, city staff, elected officials and even the chief of police have sown division and spread defamatory information about the Independent Monitor (IM) Aeiramique Glass and the Office of the Independent Monitor (OIM) Data Analyst, Greg Gelembiuk. From spewing petty gossip to fabricating outright lies, this campaign to derail independent oversight of MPD is bringing the local flavor of “political opportunism” to a new low. Several players have apologized to the IM and Data Analyst in private, but most have failed to do so in public, where the harm has been amplified by the Wisconsin State Journal (WSJ) and Channel 3000. 

Whether it be the result of biases, incompetence or just sloppy reporting, both news agencies have demonstrated little care for the truth when printing headlines about the OIM. When I asked an editor at the WSJ why he printed a defamatory claim from the Chief’s memo regarding the OIM data analyst’s handling of records without fact-checking it, he said that the Chief’s claim itself is worthy of a headline. I then asked him, if the Chief claimed that he – the editor at the WSJ – stole little kids’ bike seats, would he print that as a headline too? He responded by thanking me for calling. 

The WSJ has since published a lengthy editor’s note and a series of corrections, and updated the online version of their story, admitting that their original story reported allegations as fact and exaggerated concerns about Gelembiuk’s handling of data.

Over the past week, we have witnessed yet another coordinated wave of attacks against IM Glass, her office and the Police Civilian Oversight Board (PCOB). Past and present city agents argue that the IM’s investigation into MPD officer choices and behavior during the arrest of the PCOB chair poses a serious conflict of interest. The critics leading this charge are misrepresenting the process and willfully ignoring facts, including the gaping, systemic conflicts of interest built into the MPD’s own internal disciplinary system. 

If we are going to debate standards for investigatory processes, we must start with MPD. 

Here is how MPD’s complaint process works:

1.)  A complaint against an officer is routed directly to the MPD Professional Standards Internal Affairs (PSIA) division. This means police officers are tasked with investigating their own friends and coworkers.

The structural conflicts only deepen from there…

2.)  Once an investigation concludes, PSIA recommends a determination. 

3.)  While the Chief of Police usually accepts PSIA’s recommendation, they retain the unilateral power to reopen the investigation or substitute their own conclusion.

4.)  This conclusion can be taken to a five-member, mayoral-appointed, quasi-judicial board known as the Police and Fire Commission (PFC) to decide on an outcome for the subject of the complaint. 

Three important details of note:

• The mayor depends on support from the police to get elected.
• The mayoral-appointed PFC has almost no history of finding an officer in the wrong for harming a civilian. 
• PSIA investigators don’t just investigate their peers; they are also responsible for examining the very command staff who hold power over their careers, including decisions regarding hiring, promotions, demotions, and terminations. 

It is difficult to overstate the inherent bias in this framework. Rather than exercising rigorous oversight, the majority of city alders historically have deferred to MPD, treating its authority as absolute. After all, the last thing an incumbent wants during campaign season is to have the police union support their opponent.

The result of this framework is a grave lack of accountability at MPD. When OIR Group performed a comprehensive review of MPD, they noted its leniency with misconduct, including the unusually low frequency of civilian complaints that were sustained and that resulted in formal discipline. PSIA sustains only about one percent of the use-of-force complaints it receives, a rate drastically below the national average. 

When Tony Robinson Jr’s parents sued and won a significant settlement from MPD after Officer Matt Kenny shot and killed Tony, a primary argument that their attorneys used was that PSIA ignored all forensic evidence in its investigation of the shooting and assumed all of Kenny’s statements were true, exemplifying the lack of accountability in MPD that resulted in the shooting.

Compare MPD’s insular network with the role of the IM:

1.)  A complaint against an officer is routed to the OIM. The OIM is completely independent from the police department.

2.)  The IM investigates the complaint and reviews any relevant information, including the investigation conducted by MPD.

3.)  The IM makes a determination on legality and policy violations, offering recommendations where needed.

Three important details of note:

• The IM does not investigate or rule on the behavior of anyone within the body that appointed her or holds her accountable. 
• The IM is an external, independent entity investigating officer behavior.
• The IM is neither an elected official nor does she have the power or resources to impact political outcomes. 

To understand just how separate her office is from the standard judicial pipeline, consider a little more closely, the process that occurs after MPD detains or arrests an individual:

The Police Track: MPD officers generate reports and recommend charges against the individual to the District Attorney. Simultaneously, Internal Affairs can investigate the officers’ behavior and creates a report with a suggested determination for the Chief. The Chief then makes disciplinary determinations and may recommend employment changes to the Police and Fire Commission.

The Judicial Track: The D.A. uses those police reports to decide whether to prosecute. If they decide to prosecute, a judge or jury ultimately decides the outcome for the civilian.

The Oversight Track: The Office of the Independent Monitor investigates the officer’s behavior or reviews the Internal Affairs file. The Monitor then makes a determination on legality and policy violations, offering recommendations where needed.

The Independent Monitor does not investigate the civilian, has zero input regarding the civilian’s charges and holds no influence over whether that civilian is prosecuted. Her scope is strictly limited to police conduct. 

From its inception five years ago, the Office of the Independent Monitor (OIM) and the PCOB have faced intense institutional resistance. They were initially blocked by City Attorney Michael Haas from securing competent external assistance and the previous monitor suffered a severe and prolonged health crisis. Both the office and the board were subject to vicious “divide and conquer” tactics employed by city staff and elected officials. Despite being chronically underfunded and repeatedly attacked, a new PCOB was sworn in, a new Independent Monitor and Data Analyst were hired, and they are now fully operational and executing their duties.

 We must have access to fair, independent and rigorous investigations of police behavior and the majority of our scrutiny belongs on the 170-year-old police department that rules the city with an arsenal and a $90,000,000 budget rather than the brand new, unarmed, barely funded, independent watchdog dedicated to holding it accountable. 

 The current city backlash against IM Glass, the OIM and the PCOB is rooted in neither facts nor reality. It has been a source of bad information to local media outlets causing them to have to make corrections weeks after publishing erroneous information. It is causing personal and professional harm. It is syphoning time and attention from the OIM and PCOB that is supposed to be focused on serving Madison’s most vulnerable residents. Couched in technocratic discourse about process and accountability, it is a politically motivated campaign to misinform the public, and one that appeals directly to that bigoted demographic in Madison who believe that if Black and brown residents are being disproportionately policed and detained, they probably deserve it. No promise for political advancement is worth feeding that deadly narrative. No matter what they say or what other good deeds they perform: any mayor, city staff member or politician who is obstructing the mandate for the independent oversight mechanism of the Madison Police Department is increasing the risk of abuse or death to people in distress for whom emergency services are called and they will be held politically responsible. This reckless nonsense must end now.  

This opinion piece reflects the opinion of its author, not necessarily those of Madison365, its staff, board of directors or donors.